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Abstract
This article shows the different positions 
about the debate between law and economy, 
especially, the competence, legitimacy and con-
venience of  constitutional courts intervention 
in the making of  economic policies. To do it, 
Firstly, we present the general context of  the 
evolution of  constitutional law, that is to say, 
the growing importance and power of  consti-
tutional courts in the contemporary democratic 
societies. Secondly, we focus in Colombian 
case, for that reason, (i) we explain why the 
Colombian case is relevant for our research, (ii) 
we describe the Colombian constitutional law 
background, (iii) we present the main effects of  
the Colombian Constitutional Court decisions 
in the Colombian economy as well as the criti-
cism about the Constitutional Court’s activity, 
(iv) we emphasize in the role of  Colombian 
Constitutional Court in defining health policy. 
Thirdly, we summarize the main arguments 
for and against the intervention of  Colombian 
Constitutional Court in the making of  econo-
mic policies in general, and the Colombian 
health policy in particular. Finally, we expose 
some final conclusions. 
Key words
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TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES 
Y POLÍTICAS ECONÓMICAS  
CASO COLOMBIANO
Resumen
Este artículo muestra las diferentes posiciones 
sobre el debate entre el derecho y economía, 
especialmente la competencia, legitimidad y 
comodidad de los tribunales constitucionales, 
intervención en la adopción de políticas econó-
micas. En primer lugar, presentamos el contexto 
general de la evolución del derecho constitucio-
nal, es decir, la importancia creciente y el poder 
de los tribunales constitucionales en el actual 
contexto de las sociedades democráticas. En 
segundo lugar, nos concentramos en el caso 
Colombiano; por esta razón, (i) nos explica-
mos por qué el caso colombiano es pertinente 
para nuestra investigación, ii) describimos los 
antecedentes del derecho constitucional colom-
biano, (iii) presentamos los efectos principales 
de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana y sus 
decisiones en la economía Colombiana, así 
como las críticas sobre la actividad del Tribunal 
Constitucional, y (iv) hacemos hincapié en la 
función de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana 
para definir la política sanitaria. En tercer lugar, 
resumimos los principales argumentos en pro 
y contra la intervención de la Corte Constitu-
cional Colombiana en la adopción de políticas 
económicas en general, y la política sanitaria 
en particular. Por último, exponemos algunas 
conclusiones finales.
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INTRODUCTION: 
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
This article pretends to bring a possible answer 
to this question: It is advisable that Constitutio-
nal Courts interfere in the making of  Economic 
Policy? This is a issue that many countries, 
especially developing countries, have been 
facing currently. The debate about this issue has 
risen in the last decades because of  the new role 
of  constitutional courts in the contemporary 
societies. 
Our hypothesis is that there is a relationship bet-
ween judicial activism and economic growth; 
an unlimited judicial activism can be produce 
economic disequilibrium as well as a complex 
situation of  protection of  human rights. It 
happens because judges do not consider the 
economic consequences of  their decisions.
In our research we used a methodology that 
combines a compilation of  background infor-
mation as well as comparative method. First at 
all, we collected all the papers (books, magazi-
nes, newspapers) about our research problem, 
then, we selected the most relevant information. 
Secondly, we looked for representative cases 
into the Colombian Constitutional Court juris-
prudence and selected four representative cases 
(Case of  mortgage debtors (case of  UPAC), 
Case of  forcedly displaced population, Case of  
prisoners and the case of  the right to health).
Thirdly, we looked at some countries that 
have faced the same debates about the Cons-
titutional Courts interference in the Economic 
Policy Making. Finally, after this comparative 
law exercise, we analyzed the information and 
suggested an answer for our research question.
1. THE POwER OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS 
Constitutional Court annulling reform package 
would ruin economy. It was a headline in a Tur-
kish newspaper that represents the importance 
of  Constitutional Courts in a contemporary 
society. Last month, one of  the most important 
news in Turkey was the anxiously waiting for 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling about a reform 
package proposed by Turkish government1. 
The experts had predicted that if  the Consti-
tutional Court annuls one or more articles of  
the package, this would cause great financial 
damage. For instance, the Court’s decision can 
scare foreign investors and produce an econo-
mic crisis. That is why, businessman, investors 
and citizens centered their attention on the 
Justices of  the Turkish Constitutional Court. 
Some Turkish could not understand why the 
Constitutional Court can be change the econo-
mic future of  their country.
Just like Turkish, citizens of  many countries 
have been asking the same questions about 
the competence, legitimacy and convenience 
of  constitutional courts intervention in the 
making of  economic policies. The fact is that 
indeed, in the last decades has developed a ten-
dency to give more power to courts in order to 
control the other branches: the legislative and 
executive. 
This tendency has been developing in concor-
dance with other controversial tendency: the 
theory of  social rights and their justiciability. 
That is why; democratic countries have been 
incorporating in their constitutions bill of  rights 
that include social, economical and cultural 
rights (also known as second and third gene-
ration rights). To enforce this kind of  rights, 
1 BAYSAL, Ercan, et al. Constitutional Court 
annulling reform package would ruin economy, 
Today’s Zaman (newspaper). Available at:  http://
www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215148- 
constitutional-court-annulling-reform-package-
would-ruin-economy.html(06-08-2010)
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constitutions provide to citizens several sorts of  
legal actions.
In this context, constitutional courts have been 
empowered by constitutions. What this means 
is that constitutional courts have more powers 
than before to interfere in economic, social and 
politics issues. This has stimulated a lot of  cras-
hes between the branches, especially between 
judicial and legislative branches. This situation 
produced a new way to see the classical prin-
ciple of  separation of  powers. According to 
Cooter:
“A conventional formula distinguishes among 
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of  
government. By convention, law should be made 
by the legislature, enforced by the executive, and 
interpreted by the courts. Reality is much more 
complicated than this simple formula. Each of  
three branches of  government performs all three 
activities, although not to an equal extent”2.
There is a vigorously debate about the implica-
tions of  the expansion on judicial power and 
the effects of  this power, particularly in coun-
tries where the democracy has not been totally 
consolidated. 
“Judicial optimists draw on the experience of  poli-
ties that a successful transition to democracy, such 
as South Africa and Germany, to argue that judi-
cial review has an important democratic pay-off  
by strengthening constitutions. Judicial pessimists, 
on the other hand, draw on the experience of  older, 
consolidated democracies, such as United States, 
to argue that empowering courts weakens citizen’s 
attachment to constitutions and undermines the 
ability of  legislatures to solve pressing problems”3.
2 Cooter, Robert. The Strategic Constitution. Princeton 
University Press. New Jersey. 2002. p. 173.
3 Schor, Miguel. “An Essay on the Emergence of  
Constitutional Courts: The Cases of  Mexico and Co-
lombia”. In: Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies. 
Vol. 16. No. 1. 2008. Suffolk University Law School 
Research Paper No. 08-31. Available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1134183(03-08-2010). p. 3.
In conclusion, unlike before, the Constitutional 
Courts have a relevant role in a democratic 
society. Thus, besides the traditional role of  
interpreting law the courts have the power to 
interference in the making of  public policies. 
The constitutional courts can interference in 
the making of  public policies by annulling laws 
as well as by interpreting those in a specific way 
in order to enforce social rights in some cases. 
2. THE COLOMBIAN CASE: ENFORCING 
RIGHTS BY JUDICIAL ACTIvISM 
In the first section of  this paper, we presented 
the general context of  the evolution of  cons-
titutional law, that is to say, the new roles of  
constitutional court in a democratic society. 
Now, in this section we will present the impact of  
these tendencies in the Colombian legal system. 
First, it is important to say why Colombian as 
well as countries in process to be a consolidated 
democracy, can be interesting object of  study, 
then, we will to set out the Colombian constitu-
tional law background, third, we will to present 
the main effects of  the Colombian Constitutio-
nal Court decisions in the Colombian economy 
as well as the criticism about the Constitutional 
Court’s activity, finally, we will to emphasize in 
the role of  Colombian Constitutional Court in 
defining health policy
2.1  Relevance of legal debates from 
countries that are on the way to the 
consolidation of the democracy
Sometimes scholars refuse to study the expe-
rience of  the developing world because there 
is a belief  that new democracies or countries 
in process to be a democratic society should 
to copy the best practices of  consolidated 
democracies, such as United States of  America 
or Germany4. The problem of  this point of  
view is that important theories as well as legal 
and political debates about the way towards a 
4 Ibíd.
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consolidated democracy are ignored, even by 
some scholars from countries in process to be a 
strong democratic society, who just try to imi-
tated foreign ideas without a critical insertion 
process. 
It is obvious that there are centers of  knowledge 
that have a great influence in the legal theory, 
however, on the way from these centers to recep-
tion sites, sometimes legal theories can change, 
their meaning can be modified by scholars from 
reception sites. These transmutations of  ideas 
should not be dismissed only because there are 
not totally original ideas. The relationship bet-
ween “production sites” of  judicial theory and 
“reception sites” is developed at greater length 
by the professor Diego López5.
 In the Colombian case, the 1991 Constitu-
tion was the product of  a great constitutional 
experimentation, this Constitution created a 
Welfare State, changed the power structure, 
incorporated a wide bill of  rights composed of  
civil and political rights, as well as social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and collective rights, created a 
new and powerful constitutional watch guard: 
The Colombian Constitution Court, and last 
but not least, the Constitution enjoins the State 
to protect and fulfill the principles and rights in 
the bill of  rights6 The Colombian case is thus 
worth studying. 
2.2 Colombian Constitutional context 
In this section we will expose briefly the main 
aspects of  Colombian constitutional context, 
to start, we will talk about the powers of  the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, then, we will 
show some possible causes of  Court activism. 
The 1991 Constitution created two cons-
titutional citizen actions which determine 
5 LÓPEZ, Diego. Teoría Impura del Derecho, la trans-
formación de la cultura jurídica latinoamericana. Legis. 
Bogotá. 2008.
6 Article 2, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION.
the Constitutional Court’s forms of  juris-
diction: abstract and concrete control of  
constitutionality. The fist one is the public action 
of  unconstitutionality by virtue of  which any citi-
zen can demand the Court that a law or decree 
be declared unconstitutional, without him or 
her being a lawyer or having any particular 
interest in the issue, as opposed to other legal 
systems that require either or both of  these 
conditions. 
The tutela action is the other constitutional 
action contained in the 1991 Colombian Cons-
titution, by virtue of  which any person may 
directly request any judge to protect his or her 
fundamental rights when they are being viola-
ted by a state agent or an individual which the 
person is subordinated, and when there is no 
other legal action that can be used to prevent 
the right violation from continuing. 
As with the public action of  unconstitutionality, 
citizens do not need to be a lawyer to file a 
tutela action. Judges are obliged to give priority 
to tutela actions, which are thus decided within 
ten days. 
2.3 Judicial activism
The next point is the sources or causes of  
Constitutional Court activism. There is not 
a consensus about it; however, we propose to 
classify the possible sources of  judicial activism 
in Colombia in four kinds: legal, ideological, 
factual and political sources, in other words: 
(i) constitutional competences of  Colombia 
Constitutional Court as well as open texture 
of  the constitution; (ii) new ideology about the 
judicial role; (iii) usurpation of  competences 
by Constitutional Court and; (iv) inefficiency 
of  the legislative and executive as well as the 
political parties and social movements. 
The 1991 Constitution gives to Court institutio-
nal and legal elements in order to enforcement 
the values, principles and right contained in the 
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Constitution, such a tutela action and the public 
action of  unconstitutionality, which as we saw ear-
lier, some academics think that these new powers 
can be explain the judicial activism, nevertheless, 
the Constitutional Court “has interpreted these 
competences in a generous way”7, for example, the 
Court interpreted that its competence to decide 
upon the constitutionality of  a law includes not 
only its power to either maintain it in the legal 
order by declaring its constitutionality or annul it 
but also its power to declare it conditionally consti-
tutional, by maintaining it in the legal order and 
offering the only constitutional interpretation 
the text can be given8. 
For this way, the Court has modified some laws. 
It has been possible because of  the open texture 
of  the constitution allows judges to interpreter 
the constitution in an unlimited way9.
On the other hand, some academics think that 
the source of  the judicial activism is not the 
constitutional text. They argue that we should 
to look at the new particular set of  ideas about 
the judicial role. That is why, “activism is a 
function of  the ideas held by judges about their insti-
tutional role”10. The judges believe that they have 
the major role in a democratic society; they 
think that should to impulse the social change, 
for example, protecting social rights. 
The new Constitution encourages the judges to 
interpret the law in a special way. When judges 
are applying a law in a specific case, they must 
remember the values and principles of  the 
Welfare State, if  the solution given by the law is 
7 Ibíd. 
8 Case C-112/00.
9 CARRASqUILLA, Alberto. “Economía y Consti-
tución: hacía un enfoque estratégico”. En: Revista de 
Derecho Público. No. 12. Universidad de los Andes. 
Bogotá. 2001. p. 22.
10 NUNES, Rodrigo. Ideational Origins of  Progressive 
Judicial Activism: The Colombian Constitutional 
Court and the Right to Health. APSA 2009 Toronto 
Meeting Paper. 2009. Available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1449536(07-08-2010). p. 3.
“unfair”, the judges can refuse to apply this law 
and instead, to apply directly the constitutional 
values, principles and fundamental right in 
order to solve the case “fairly”. 
As opposed to this position, there are a group 
of  Colombian academics who think that the 
source of  the judicial activism is the wrong 
interpretation of  the Constitution by the Cons-
titutional Court. They argue that the creation of  
the theory about the “new law” or “anti-forma-
lism” is just an invention that allows dangerous 
judicial discretion. Undoubtedly, When the 
Justices of  the Constitutional Court modify the 
main sense of  a law by interpretation, they are 
creating law, as a matter of  fact, the court has 
not interpreted reasonably the law, the Court 
has ignore the law11 something inadmissible 
in a Roman-Germany legal system where the 
positive law (writing into a collection codified) 
is the main source to decide cases. 
Finally, some scholars consider that the pro-
blem is the inefficiency of  the legislative and 
executive as well as the political parties and 
social movements, according to Uprimny:
“This activism has also been stimulated by two 
structural political factors: the crisis in political 
representation and the weakness of  social move-
ments and opposition parties in Colombia. Because 
Colombia generalized disenchantment with politics, 
certain social groups have demanded solutions from 
constitutional jurisdiction to problems that should 
be debated and overcome by means of  democratic 
process in the first place”12.
11 TAMAYO, Javier. “La Corte Constitucional y la 
nueva interpretación del derecho”. En: MOLINA BE-
TANCUR, Carlos Mario (Comp.). Corte Constitucional 
y Economía. Universidad de Medellín. Medellín. 2010. 
p. 101.
12 UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. The Judicial Protection of  Social 
Rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court: Cases 
and Debates. 2006. Avalaible at: http://dejusticia.
org/interna.php?id_tipo_ publicacion=2&id_publica-
cion=361(04-07-2010). p. 6.
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2.4 Controversial decisions and their 
economic consequences 
In this section we will analyze three controver-
sial cases that generated strong criticism against 
the Colombian Constitutional Court because 
of  their economic consequences. These cases 
are: (i) the case of  mortgage debtors (case of  
UPAC); (ii) the case of  forcedly displaced 
population; (iii) the case of  prisoners.
In the next section of  this article we will focus 
in another interesting case: the case of  the right 
to health. All these decisions have implied sig-
nificant budgetary costs. 
2.4.1 The case of mortgage debtors
There was a financial system called UPAC 
(Unity of  constant acquisitive power), in 1997 
Colombia went into a deep recession that 
sent into crisis a lot of  debtors, approximately 
800.000 debtors who had taken loans to buy 
their homes with the UPAC system. In 1999, 
about 200.000 debtors and their families were 
on the verge of  losing their homes.
They asked the government for a reform of  the 
financial system, even some of  them imple-
mented civil disobedience strategies in order to 
refuse to continue paying their mortgages or to 
hand their homes over the banks. However, they 
never received an answer from the Congress or 
the President. 
Finally, debtors decided to launch constitutio-
nality actions against the norms that regulated 
the UPAC system, the public action of  unconstitu-
tionality and the tutela action, mentioned above. 
In 1999, the Constitutional Court pronounced 
three decisions on the matter13 which protected 
and relieved mortgage debtors. 
In these decisions the Constitutional Court 
ordered to tying the UPAC system to inflation, 
forbidding the addition of  owed interests to 
13 Cases: C-383/99 C-700/99 and C-747/99.
capital debt and the recalculation of  mortgages. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, orde-
red to Congress to pass a new law on housing 
financing that allows to Colombians enjoy their 
fundamental rights to have a home and live 
with dignity. 
These decisions were severely criticized by 
economist as well as politics and lawyers. 
The criticisms can be classify in two groups: 
first, criticisms that attack the competence of  
the Constitutional Court to make this kind of  
decisions, and second, criticisms that attack 
the Court decisions because of  their economic 
consequences. 
The main criticism was the violation of  the 
principle of  separation of  powers. Some scho-
lars argued that the Constitutional Court had 
encroached upon the powers of  Congress14. 
These scholars think that these kinds of  issues 
should to be debated by the Congress and 
Government because they are legitimated to 
make decisions about country’s economic 
policy because that is what they were elected 
for. On the contrary, the justices of  the Constitu-
tional Court are not legitimated to interference 
in the making of  economic policies15. 
On the other hand, the Court decision was also 
criticized because of  its economic consequen-
ces. Economist argued that the addition of  
owed interests to capital debt allow that people 
who have low ingress get a loan with low perio-
dical payment fees, therefore, forbidding the 
addition of  owed interests to capital debt and 
the recalculation of  mortgages restricted the 
access of  poor people to home loans16.
14 NÚÑEZ, Antonio José. Manifiesto por una justicia 
constitucional responsable. Legis. Bogotá. 2005. p. 32.
15 KALMANOVITZ, Salomón. Ensayos sobre la Banca 
Central en Colombia. Editorial Norma. Bogotá. 2003.
16 CLAVIJO, Sergio. “Fallos y fallas económicas de las 
altas cortes: El caso de Colombia 1991-2000”. En: 
Revista de Derecho Público. No. 12. Universidad de los 
Andes. Bogotá. 2001. p. 43-49.
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2.4.2 The case of forcedly displaced 
population
The Colombian armed conflict has generated 
an enormous number of  forcedly displaced 
population who are forced to leave their homes 
and to migrate to cities and urban centers with 
no sources of  subsistence. This situation confi-
gures a truly humanitarian tragedy.
In 2004, many forcedly displaced persons 
started filing tutela actions, they asked to gover-
nment for protection of  their fundamental 
rights, especially the right to human dignity 
and housing. In this year, the Constitutional 
Court decided to declare the existence of  an 
“unconstitutional state of  things”; this mean 
that the Court declared that government has 
been systematically violating forcedly displaced 
persons rights17. 
In this historic decision, the Court ordered the 
national authorities to reformulated and clarify 
the strategies in order to attend the basis needs 
of  forcedly displaced population. 
This decision generated the disapproval of  many 
scholars who criticized the Court because of  its 
use of  the concrete control of  constitutionality 
to give general orders to national authorities. 
In fact, as we saw earlier, in Colombian legal 
system there are two kinds of  constitutional 
controls: the abstract control (public action of  
unconstitutionality) and the concrete control 
(tutela action). The public action of  unconstitutio-
nality has erga omnes effects, that is, the judge 
decision is mandatory to everybody. In these 
cases, the Court has to decide if  a law is consti-
tutional or not. 
As opposed to abstract control, the tutela action 
has an inter partes effects, that is, the judge only 
can give concrete orders to persons who are 
party in the judicial process. In this case, forcedly 
displaced persons filed tutela actions, (concrete 
17 Case T-025/04.
control); however, Constitutional Court gave 
general orders to national authorities. 
2.4.3 The case of prisoners
In this case several prisoners filed tutela actions 
against the state’s penitentiary authorities. The 
prisoner was claiming that their constitutional 
rights to life, dignity and health were being 
violated by the state as a consequence of  the 
over-crowdedness and precarious circumstan-
ces of  the prisons they were in. 
As the case of  forcedly displaced population 
the Constitutional Court declared the existence 
of  an “unconstitutional state of  things”. Con-
sequently, the Court ordered to Ministry of  
Justice to build more prisons, modernize the 
already existing prisons and hire more security 
guards for them. 
In this case as well as the case of  forcedly 
displaced population and the case of  mortgage 
debtors, the Constitutional Court conditioned 
the priorities and orientation of  the governmen-
tal strategies in these sectors. Thus, questions 
about the competence, legitimacy and conve-
nience of  Court decisions have been arising. 
2.5 Health policy and Constitutional Courts
The intervention by the constitutional courts in 
a wide range of  issues, including those invol-
ving social and economic rights, such as the 
right to health, has generated a debate about the 
competence and legitimacy of  the judiciary in 
entering areas which have for long been percei-
ved as belonging property within the domain of  
the legislative and executive18. 
In the case of  the right to health, the debate has 
a particularity: the relationship between it and 
18 MURALIDHAR, S. Implementation of  Court orders 
in the area of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: an 
overview of  the experience of  the Indian Judiciary. IELRC 
working paper. 2002. p. 4.
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the right to life. This particularity generates the 
inclusion of  moral reasoning besides to legal, 
political and economic arguments in the debate, 
for that reason, some people who disagree 
with the justiciability of  social and economic 
rights consider that in the case of  the right of  
health can be convenient moderate degrees of  
justiciability. 
On the other hand, some scholars consider that 
in the debate about the justiciability of  the right 
to health, moral reasoning should to be out 
of  the question. To illustrate this position, we 
will to quote a passage of  a dialogue between 
William Shatner and Rush Limbaugh19 that 
took place on a recent episode of  the television 
talk show “Raw Nerve” in the United States, 
we read this passage in an article wrote by  Uwe 
E. Reinhardt who is an economics professor at 
Princeton University. 
“Shatner: Here’s my premise, and you agree with 
it or not. If  you have money, you are going to get 
health care. If  you don’t have money, it’s more 
difficult.
Limbaugh: If  you have money you’re going to get 
a house on the beach. If  you don’t have money, 
you’re going to live in a bungalow somewhere.
Shatner: Right, but we’re talking about health care.
Limbaugh: What’s the difference?
Shatner: The difference is we’re talking about 
health care, not a house or a bungalow.
Limbaugh: “No. No. You’re assuming that there 
is some morally superior aspect to health care than 
there is to a house
Shatner: No, I’m not moral at all. I want to keep 
the subject, for the moment, on the health care 
thing”20. 
Focusing in Colombian case again, we will des-
cribe in a few words the Colombian healthcare 
19 Rush Limbaugh is a famous radio host in the United 
States, conservative political commentator, and an 
influential opinion leader in conservative politics and 
Conservatism in the United States.
20 Uwe E. Reinhardt.
system as well as its problems, then, we will 
present a landmark decision about right to 
health in Colombia, the Constitutional Court 
decision number T-760/08.
2.6 Colombian healthcare system (Law 100)
In 1993, the Colombian government makes a 
major healthcare reform inspired by neolibe-
ral ideas. The Law 100 created a competitive 
surrogate model which used public and private 
insurers as surrogates to purchase health care 
for insured patients. 
This system also established a two-tier system 
of  benefits: (i) the contributory regime for those 
formally employed, and (ii) the subsidized 
regime that includes approximately one-half  of  
the benefits in the contributory regime. Every 
regime has a list of  medicines and treatment 
that the patients can access (in Spanish Plan 
Obligatorio de salud – POS).
This system has been widely criticized by 
patients. Inefficiency and poor quality are the 
main problems of  the system, for that reason, 
patients increasingly turned to the courts to 
secure treatments and services21. 
Between 1999 and 2005, the Colombian 
Human Rights Ombudsman Office calculates 
that 328.191 tutelas actions were presented 
relating to the right to health; approximately 
80% of  those cases were granted. In addition, 
between 1999 and 2005, approximately 89% of  
surgeries, 93% of  the treatments and 84% of  the 
procedures that were petitioned for using tutela 
action were already included in the contributory 
(Plan obligatorio de salud POS) or subsidized 
regimen (Plan obligatorio de salud del régimen 
subsidiado POSS).
21 YAMIN, Alicia, et al. The role of  courts in defining 
health policy: the case of  the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court. Available at: http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/ hrp/documents/Yamin_Parra_wor-
king_paper.pdf  (06-08-2010). p. 2.
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These statistics show “a health system with little 
capacity for internal regulation, where judicial 
recourse has become a form of  escape valve”22. 
From 2006 to 2008, the number of  tutelas actions 
has been increasing significantly as this chart 
shows: 
2.7 The case of the right to health:  
a landmark decision
The Constitutional Colombian Court has 
applied the conexity theory to enforce social 
right, thus, social rights can be protected 
through tutela action when those are connected 
with fundamental rights, for instance, the right 
to health in some cases is strongly connected 
with the right to life, for example, when the 
patient’s life is at risk, in this cases the right to 
health can be enforce by the judges. 
In 2008, the Constitutional Colombian Court 
handed down a landmark decision23. In this 
decision, the Court ordered a restructuring of  
the country’s health care system. This decision 
came as the culmination of  a wave of  litigation 
to enforce the right to health, as we saw earlier. 
The Court ordered to unify the benefits plans 
(POS and POSS), first for children and later for 
22  Ibídem.
23  Case T-760/08.
TUTELAS ACTIONS FILED
2006 – 2008
Year 2006 2007 2008 Total
Right number % number % number % number %
Health 96.229 37,6 107.238 37,8 142.957 41,5 346.424 39,2
Right to Petition 99.819 39,0 103.844 36,6 113.224 32,9 316.887 35,8
Life 86.320 33,7 91.251 32,2 88.621 25,7 266.192 30,1
Social Rights 68.033 26,6 57.594 20,3 77.268 22,4 202.895 22,9
Due Process 40.270 15,7 44.364 15,6 42.281 12,3 126.915 14,4
Source: Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman Office
adults, in the latter case progressively and taking 
into account financial sustainability, as well as 
the epidemiological profile of  the population. 
The Court also called upon the government 
to adopt deliberate measures to progressively 
realize universal coverage by 2010.
In addition, the Constitutional Court ordered 
to National Commission for Health Regulation 
to immediately and on an annual basis compre-
hensively update the benefits included in the 
POS and POSS through a process that includes 
direct and effective participation of  the medical 
community and the users of  the health system. 
3. COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT IN THE MAKING  
OF ECONOMIC POLICY
In this section of  the article, we will summarize 
the main arguments for and against the inter-
vention of  Colombian Constitutional Court in 
the making of  economic policies.
First at all, the violation of  the principle of  sepa-
ration of  powers is the main argument against 
the intervention of  Constitutional Court in the 
making of  economic policies. According to 
this perspective, Constitutional Court does not 
have the competence to make decision about 
a country’s economic model; this competence 
is exclusively of  the Congress in coordination 
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with the government24. For that reason, whene-
ver the Court interferes in economic issues, it 
violates the principle of  separation of  powers25. 
On the other hand, in spite of  not having a 
democratic origin as the congress or the gover-
nment, the Constitutional Court exercises an 
essential democratic role: the defense of  the 
minorities rights26. That is why, in a society 
democracy is necessary an impartial judge who 
protect the minorities against the power of  the 
majorities. 
However, some scholars think that this pro-
tective role can generate a macroeconomic 
disequilibrium that affects the economic 
growth, for example, the case of  mortgage 
debtors27. For that reason, the terrible economic 
consequences can be justify the not interven-
tion of  Constitutional Court in the making of  
economic policies. 
According to this perspective, the economic 
consequences should to limit the judicial 
activism. Radical scholars, such as, Arango28 
consider that the judges must to enforce the 
rights, even the social and economic rights, and 
do not pay attention about the possible econo-
mic consequences of  their decisions.
In the middle of  these theories, some people 
argue that judicial activism is Convenient only 
if  it respects the principle of  separation of  
24 AMAYA, Carlos. “Corte Constitucional y Economía: 
análisis de fallos y propuesta para el caso colombiano”. 
En: Revista de Derecho Público. No. 12. Universidad de 
los Andes. Bogotá. 2001.
25 CLAVIJO, Sergio. “Fallos y fallas económicas de las 
altas cortes: El caso de Colombia 1991-2000”. Ob. Cit. 
26 UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. The Judicial Protection of  Social 
Rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court: Cases and 
Debates. Ob. Cit. p.17.
27 KALMANOVITZ, Salomón. Ensayos sobre la Banca 
Central en Colombia. Ob. Cit. p. 151.
28 ARANGO, Rodolfo. Derechos, constitucionalismo y 
democracia. Universidad Externado de Colombia. 
Bogotá. 2004. p. 180.
powers and the judges pay attention about the 
possible economic consequences of  their deci-
sions. For example, justice Cepeda29 argue that 
in the last years the Constitutional Court has 
considered the economic consequences of  its 
decisions, for that reason, the Court has handed 
down conditionally sentences. 
CONCLUSIONS
Democracy, economic equality and economic 
growth are important objectives in contempo-
rary societies; however, sometimes it can be 
difficult to satisfy at the same time these objec-
tives, especially, in developing countries. 
With the constitutionalization of  social rights, 
the judges face difficult dilemmas when they 
are deciding cases, especially cases of  social 
and economic rights, such as the right to health. 
For one side, the judges have the pressure of  the 
person who asks for protection to his funda-
mental rights, on the other side, judges have the 
pressure of  people who are ready to accuse them 
to violate the principle of  separation of  powers 
and produce macroeconomic disequilibrium.
This problematic situation was described by 
Frank Michelman in the following way: 
“By constitutionalizing social rights, the argument 
often has run, you force the judiciary to a hapless 
choice between usurpation and abdication, from 
which there is no escape without embarrassment or 
discredit. One way, it is said, lies the judicial choice 
to issue positive enforcement orders in a pretentious, 
inexpert, probably vain but nevertheless resented 
attempt to reshuffle the most basic resource-mana-
gement priorities of  the public house-hold against 
prevailing political will. The other way lies the judi-
cial choice to debase dangerously the entire currency 
of  rights and the rule of  law by openly ceding to 
executive and parliamentary bodies an unreviewable 
29 CEPEDA, Manuel José. Polémicas Constitucionales. 
Legis. Bogotá. 2005.
Prolegómenos - Derechos y Valores
211Bogotá, D.C. Colombia - Volumen XIII - No. 26 - Julio - Diciembre 2010 - ISSN 0121-182X
JAVIER FRANCO - PABLO MEDRANO
privilege of  indefinite postponement of  a declared 
constitutional right”30.
The Constitutional Courts activism is not an 
exclusive Colombian issue, there are a lot of  
countries where the debate between about 
the competence, legitimacy and convenience 
of  constitutional courts intervention in the 
making of  economic policies has took place31, 
also, there are a variety of  answers for this issue 
and we should learn about that. 
As a final conclusion, we believe that judicial 
activism is advisable only if  it respects the prin-
ciple of  separation of  powers and the judges 
pay attention about the possible economic 
consequences of  their decisions. In economic 
issues the priorities change from time to time, 
and this may also require changes in the eco-
nomic policies, if  the Constitutional Court 
ties the hands of  the policy-makers will make 
it difficult to adjust policies to meet changing 
conditions. It is obviously that the Congress 
and the Government have been inefficient in 
their constitutional roles of  enforce rights, such 
as the right to health, however, the question 
is: legislative and executive inefficient justify 
Constitutional Court activism? 
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